In the m-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer (OT) model, one party Alice sends n bits to another party Bob, Bob can get only m bits from the n bits. However, Alice cannot know which m bits Bob received. Y.Mu and Naor presented classical m-out-of-n Oblivious Tmnsfer based on discrete logarithm. As the work of Shor, the discrete logarithm can be solved in polynomial time by quantum computers, so such O T s are unsecure to the quantum computer. In this paper, we construct a quantum m-out-of-n O T ( Q O T ) scheme based on the transmission of polarized light and show that the scheme is robust to general attacks, i.e. the QOT scheme satisfies statistical correctness and statistical privacy.
Introduction
A number of recent papers have provided compelling evidence that certain computational, cryptographic, and information theoretic tasks can be performed more efficiently by models based on quantum physics than those based on classical physics [9] .
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is used as a key component in many applications of cryptography [11, 5 , 101. Informally speaking in an Oblivious Transfer, Alice sends a bit to Bob that he receives half the time (this fact is out of their control), Alice does not find out what happened, Bob knows if he get the bit or nothing. Similarly, in a 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer, Alice has two bits bo, bl that she sends to Bob in such a way that *This work is partially supported by a grant from the Ministry of Science and Technology (#2001CCA03000), National Natural Science Fund (#G0273045) and Shanghai Science and Technology Development Fund (#03JC14014).
he can decide to get either of them at his choosing but not both. Alice never finds out which bit Bob received.
In 2001, Naor presented a 1-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer [8] , Y.Mu showed that m-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer could also be realized based on the discrete logarithm. In the m-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer(1 5 m < n) , Alice sends n bits t o Bob, Bob can get only m of them. In the case of quantum, Claude CrCpeau provided a 1-out-of-2 quantum Oblivious Transfer based on the transmission of polarized light in 1994. The protocol of CrCpeau's can be used directly to implement a one-out-of-three Oblivious Transfer.
The organization of this paper is as following: in section 2, we give the definitions of the correctness and privacy of the m-out-of-n O T protocol. In section 3, we review the 1-out-of-2 O T of Claude CrCpeau and its intuition. In section 4, we construct an m-out-of-n OT, and in section 5 we show that this scheme satisfies statistical correctness and statistical privacy .
Definitions
The natural constraints(see below) of correctness and privacy of a m-out-of-n OT(l 5 m < n) is showed below. Alice can not find out about c1,c2,. . . ,c,, and Bob can not find out more than m of bl, b2,. . . , b,.
The protocol we describe in the next section is of probabilistic nature. We cannot show that this protocol perfectly satisfies the above constraints but satisfies in a statistical sense: after an amount of work in O ( N ) time the protocol will satisfy for some positive constant E < 1. 
Quantum 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer
In this section, we introduce the quantum l-outof-2 O T provided by Claude Cr6peau [3] . Let @ denote the random variable that takes the binary value 0 with probability 1/2 and 1 with probability 1/2. Also, denote by [ ]i the selection function such that [ao,al,... , a & = ai. Let + = (I++),[ I)) and X = (I\), I /)) denote respectively the bases of rectilinear and diagonal polarization in the quantum state space of a photon. The quantum 1-out-of-2 OT is as follows: 
Quantum 1-out-of-2 OT

Intuition behind 1-out-of-2 OT
In this 1-out-of-2 QOT, Alice must prevent Bob from storing the photons and waiting until she discloses the bases before measuring them, which would allow him to obtain both of Alice's bits with certainty. To realize this, Alice gets Bob to commit to the bits that he received and the bases that he used to measure them. Before going ahead with ri, say, Alice checks that Bob had committed properly t o r,+i when he read that bit in the basis that she used to encode it.
If a t any stage Alice observes a mistake (p,+i = but r,+i # T ; +~) , she stops further interaction with Bob who is definitely not performing his legal protocol (this should never happen if Bob follows his protocol).
In this protocol, 7-17-2. . ' r , are chosen by Alice in step 1 and are sent to Bob via an ambiguous coding referred to as the BB84 coding [l]: when Alice and Bob choose the same emission and reception basis, the bit received is the same as what was sent and uncorrelated otherwise. Bob builds two subsets: one I, that will allow him to get b,, and one IF that will spoil k.
The calculations of steps 5-6 are much that all the bits in a subset must be known by Bob in order for him to be able to obtain the output bit connected to that subset.
Protocol for 'Quantum m-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer
Weak Bit Commitment
In 1993, Gilles Brassard, etc provided a quantum bit commitment scheme provably unbreakable by both parties [2] . However, unconditionally quantum bit commitment was showed impossible [7] . In [4] , Aharonov provided a weak bit commitment. (Sealing) If Bob attempts to learn information about the deposited bit b, then there is non zero probability that an honest Alice would reject.
In the following scheme, Bob will use this weak quantum bit commitment to commit.
Intuition for rn-out-of-n OT
In the m-out-of-n OT, Bob should build n subsets N must satisfy (2n-(2m+ 1 ) ) (2m+ 1) I ((2m+ 1) -n) N so that x would be an interger. we let the i's that was removed from { 1,2,. . . , N } be u1, U Z , . . . , U,.
Quantum rn-out-of-n OT
In the m-out-of-n QOT, Alice has input bl, b2,. . . , b,, Bob has input clr c2,. . . , k. The output of the scheme is b,, , b,, , . . . , b,,,, . unveil(PLj) that satisfying Puj # phj Bob randomly selects n subsets Il, I 2 , . .. , I, c {1,2;..,N} - ( 2~1 , 2 1 2 , . . . , U = } subject to lIll = II2l = ... = II,l = ( N -z ) / n , 'dj # k, IjnIk = 0 and 'dj E IC, U IC, U . . . U IC,, = pi, and he announces (Il, I 2 , . . . ,In) to Alice Alice receives (51,3,. . . , Jn)=(Ilr12,. . >I,), computes and sends bl +-bl @ ejEJ1 r j , b2 +-
. . , bn) and computes b,< t bci @ ejEJci rLj, i = 1 , 2 , . . . , m .
Analysis
In the m-out-of-n QOT, Bob must read the photons sent by Alice as they come: he cannot wait and read them later, individually or together. We assume that the channel used for the quantum transmission is free of errors, so that it is guaranteed that r: = ri whenever p,! = pi. we now show that under the assumption this protocol satisfies the statistical version of the above constraints. So, Bob can get less than m bits that sent from Alice with probability less than E~.
Correctness
Privacy
We analyse the privacy of each party individually as if he or she is facing a malicious opponent. Proof. The probability of that Bob gets more than m bits (i.e. get at least m + 1 bits). So If < 4 (i.e. 2 m + 1 < n, z = 2 n & m + ? )~) , the probability that Bob can get more than m + 1 bits is given by
Privacy for Bob
It is easy to check that izn-"(G+l+l, > 0. < 1) using Hoefding's inequality.
Finally, we show that Bob cannot get more than m bits by attacking the weak quantum bit commitment. Let the probability that he can cheat Alice in the weak QBC be p (0 < p < l), the probability that he can get one more bit is p -< E~ (E = p k ) .
So, Bob can get more than m bits that sent from Alice with probability less than E~. 0 In the 1-out-of-2 O T scheme, n = 2 and m = 1, = 4 > 4, then the probability is less than 2 . e-N.2(&-4)z = 2 . , -N . 2 ( 3 -3 ) 2 --2 . e-%
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we construct an quantum m-out-ofn O T based on the transmission of polarized light, which is an extension of the quantum 1-out-f-2 OT, and prove that this scheme satisfies statistical correctness and statistical privacy, i.e. except with a small probability e N , Bob can get the correct m bits, and cannot get one more bit than required. We think the following points is interesting for further research:
1. Implement and apply the QOT in the real world.
2. Find a QOT satisfies perfect correctness and perfect privacy.
